Japan Debates the Issue of Comfort Women

How to Cleanse Asahi’s Widespread ‘Misreports’ on Comfort Women
Masaaki Sugiura 
The Global Forum of Japan
1 December 2014, Vol. 7, No. 6

Venerable Japanese political commentator Masaaki Sugiura, offers a rebuttal to sensationalist reports in the Japanese media (specifically the Asahi Shimbun) about Japanese soldiers and “comfort women,” local girls and women from territories conquered in Japan who were essentially forced into prostitution serving Japanese soldiery before and during World War II.

Masaaki does not seem to be associated with the kinds of nationalist factions that make a habit of whitewashing Japanese behavior in the war. What he does, however, is call into question the dominant Korean and Chinese narratives about “comfort women,” and suggest that the nature and extent of the problem may well have been exaggerated in China and Korea for domestic political purposes.

An interesting issue, and an interesting read.

Li Keqiang takes on the Aparatchiks

“In some cases after the senior leaders study an issue for over a year it takes another year to get the implementation procedures settled. Isn’t this ridiculous?” Mr. Li was quoted as saying.

“Before we can simplify administrative procedures and delegate authority to lower levels of government, we really need a revolution in our own thinking,” he reportedly added.

via China’s Levels of Bureaucracy Have Gotten ‘Ridiculous,’ Premier Says – China Real Time Report – WSJ.

As skeptical as I am about the ability of a one man to alter a governance model that has been in place since well before Beijing became the Imperial capital, I hope he succeeds. But I am not optimistic.

The problems of China’s bureaucracy are not unlike those that governments face elsewhere: corruption, careerism, and the promotion of the mediocre. Those call for more than simple spankings and token firings. They demand a systemic overhaul.

When Li creates a system that recognizes, rewards, and promotes public servants who are clean, dedicated, and effective and shitcans everyone else, he will have fixed the problem. Anything short of that is so much political theater.

China’s Big Data Play

Big Data: Transforming the Design Philosophy of the Future Internet,”
Hao Yin, Yong Jiang, Chuong Lin, Yan Luo, and Yunjie Liu, 
IEEE Network,
July/August 2014 pp 14-19

For proof of how the tendrils of Chinese policy reach into science, five Chinese engineers offer their view of the current design of China’s Internet in this paper from IEEE Network. Most of the discussion is highly technical in nature, but one issue that cropped up is the paper’s complaint how “vendor lock-in” has made the current cost structure of the Internet far too high to be sustainable – a complaint that is surprising given the pervasiveness of the Internet in China, and how hardware and networking costs have been plunging for two decades.

There is more than a bit of politics in this. The study was co-funded by the Chinese government via the Ministry of Science and Technology’s National Basic Research Foundation of China, also known as Project 973 (because of its creation in March 1997), the National Natural Science Foundation of China (directly administered by the State Council), and Intel Corporation. The complaint about “vendor lock-in” is clearly aimed as a broadside against Intel, though in consideration of its role in the study, the authors clearly felt it impolitic to name names.

There is likely much more in the way of technical nationalism to be found in this paper, but this example is sufficient to underscore how China is content to infuse (i.e., taint) scientific research with politics and posturing. That the paper was accepted for publication by the IEEE should not exonerate the authors for their posturing, however well-couched.

If China doesn’t like paying Intel prices only to see the cash flow overseas, Intel’s substantial local investments notwithstanding, that is the right of the nation’s leaders. Injecting what appears to be a political snipe into a scientific paper, however, gives comfort to those who would discount legitimate Chinese research for fear of political considerations that would turn the science into junk.

Behind Tianjin Tragedy, a Company That Flouted Regulations and Reaped Profits – The New York Times

Now, more than two weeks after explosions at its warehouses leveled a swath of that district, killing 145 people, injuring more than 700 and leaving millions here fearful of toxic fallout, Rui Hai has become a symbol of something else for many Chinese: the high cost of rapid industrialization in a closed political system rife with corruption.

Source: Behind Tianjin Tragedy, a Company That Flouted Regulations and Reaped Profits – The New York Times

Why China is Playing Nice in the East China Sea

Analyzing China’s support for a crisis management mechanism in the East China Sea” 
Mathieu Duchâtel

SIPRI’s Mathieu Duchatel offers this short paper on why China went from confrontation to conversation in the East China sea, thus defusing an increasingly tense situation of its own manufacture.

He identifies and evaluates several hypotheses as to why the change has taken place, and underscores why this may – or may not – signal even bigger foreign policy changes in Beijing.

China and the Arctic Long Game

China and the Arctic: Objectives and Obstacles,” Caitlin Campbell, U.S. China Economic and Security Council Review Commission, Washington, April 13, 2012

China’s Arctic Aspirations, Linda Jakobson and Jingchao Peng, SIPRI Policy Paper 34, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Stockholm, Sweden, November 2012

China’s New Arctic Stratagem: A Strategic Buyer’s Approach to the Arctic,” Timothy Curtis Wright, Journal of Military and Strategic Studies, Volume 15, Issue 1, 2013

The Dragon Eyes the Top of the World: Arctic Policy Debate and Discussion in China, David Curtis Wright, China Maritime Studies Institute, United States Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island, August 2011

Polar Bearings: China Pursues its Interests in the North” The Economist, July 12, 2014

Race to the North: China’s Arctic Strategy and its Implications,” Shiloh Rainwater, Naval War College Review, Providence, RI, Spring 2013, Vol. 66, No. 2

Will China Purchase a Piece of the Arctic?” Mark Strauss, io9.com, April 29, 2014


China holds no territory or coastal waters that encroach upon the Arctic, and the closest the nation gets to being an arctic nation is a point of land in Heilongjiang province some 53 degrees north of the Equator and some 1,500 kilometers south of the Arctic Circle.

Those inconvenient facts have not prevented China from beginning a measured, multi-faceted campaign to establish claims on the region and its resources. There has as yet been no definitive statement on the nation’s policy in the region, but Rear Admiral Yin Zhuo of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) noted in March of 2010 “The Arctic belongs to all the people around the world, as no nation has sovereignty over it. . . . China must plan an indispensable role in Arctic exploration as we have one-fifth of the world’s population.”

The Chinese government has not distanced itself from Admiral Yin’s position, and China’s efforts since – launching two large icebreakers, establishing an Arctic research station in Norway, and politicking hard to get itself admitted (albeit as an observer) to the Arctic Council suggest that his quote may well serve as de-facto policy. That Admiral Yin’s statement is in direct contravention of the United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS, to which China is a signatory) should not be ignored.

China is playing a long-term game in the Arctic, but its end game should be clear. The only question should be whether the world is prepared to grant China its wish: a major change in the rules governing and protecting one of the world’s last great frontiers.

Is China Playing Straight in the East China Sea?

The Japan-China Maritime and Air Communication Mechanism: Operational and Strategic Considerations
Marta McLellan Ross

Japan Institute of International Affairs

Recent tensions in the South China sea have raised the possibility that confrontational behavior designed to make a point can all too easily escalate into something far more dangerous.

Apparently eager to avoid this scenario, China and Japan have begun developing a series of protocols to ensure that both countries can make their points in the standoff without things spinning out of control. Marta McLellan Ross of the Council of Foreign Affairs suggests in this paper, however, that these ostensibly laudable efforts may be nothing more than a Chinese tactic to neutralize Japan.

A fascinating read.