China Won’t Cut off the Kim Family Regime

Re-Think Chinese Policy Toward DPRK
Bonnie S. Glaser
Freeman Report
Issue 7, February 2013

In this short paper, Bonnie Glaser at the CSIS presents a cogent, well-framed case for China to cut its assistance to North Korea as a means of getting the DPRK to stop its rogue behavior. As much sense as the paper will make on Capitol Hill, it is unlikely to change China’s stance. This is because the paper does not consider the internal logic that drives Beijing’s calculus on North Korea.

While Beijing’s “dog” on the Korean peninsula enjoys biting the hand that feeds it, the dog still guards China’s back door. It remains a buffer designed to ensure that neither the US nor South Korea have forces crouched on the Yalu frontier. Its rogue behavior diverts the heat of international opprobrium as China begins to assert its own strategic posture and build its military. The loyalty Beijing continues to extend to the DPRK is a demonstration to all other allies and prospective allies that Beijing is a reliable friend, even when the going gets tough. Finally, Beijing would hate to have somebody else – Russia, for example - step in and become Pyongyang’s patron.

So Beijing cutting off Pyongyang is probably not in the cards. What is likely to be in the cards, however, is a careful effort by China to prove the the mercurial Kim Family Regime that there are wiser courses of action to pursue, and that China continues to be its best possible benefactor. Whether that will yield any worthwhile results is anyone’s guess.

Mincing Words on Chinese FDI

China Invests (Somewhat) More in the World
Derek M. Scissors
American Enterprise Institute 
January 2014

In a deep-dive based on the data produced by the American Enterprise Institute and Heritage Foundation in their China Global Investment Tracker, Derek Scissors shows us how large China’s foreign direct investment effort has become and how fast it is growing. By the end of 2015, if all things go as expected, China will surpass $100 billion per year in funds invested overseas.

The numbers are large, but when measured against other capital flows in the past, not yet at a level which should concern average Americans. Indeed, there are significant benefits from such investments. Nonetheless, Scissors suggests, we should not assume all Chinese FDI is a good thing. He joins a growing chorus of voids suggesting that national security, the growing role of China’s state-owned enterprises, and genuine reciprocity should guide policymaker approaches to Chinese FDI as much as economic benefit.

Scissors does a superb job at laying out the key issues, and I especially liked his nuanced approach to SOEs. Disappointingly, he stops short of suggesting a framework that would allow us to distinguish Chinese investments that should be welcomed, and those that should be rejected. Reading between the lines (and in keeping with AEI’s economic approach), Scissors is more concerned about debating the laissez-faire end of the business community who would prefer that government simply got out of the business of regulating Chinese foreign investment.

A worthy roundup of the issue.

Measuring the Monsoon

“India Advances in Naval Arms Race With China”
Micha’el Tanchum
The Begin Sadat Center for Strategic Studies
January 14, 2014

Media in the west has been focused on China’s increasing assertiveness in the East China Sea and the South China Sea. Less visible in the west – but plainly evident to New Delhi – China has been moving to enhance its naval and maritime presence in the Indian Ocean for some time, being careful not to raise the stakes too quickly.

In this brief paper, Micha’el Tanchum offers a sobering, pithy explanation of how China is moving toward provoking a face-off in the IO, as the response from the subcontinent shifts from the diplomatic to the unequivocal.

India now sees China’s moves as zero-sum, as each step China makes in the region is perceived as undermining New Delhi’s strategic position in its own back yard. India does not yet seem ready for a showdown, but Tanchum’s paper leaves a concern that India is not prepared to allow China’s growing influence to continue unchecked for much longer.

 

Whither China’s Nukes

China’s Strategic Capabilities and Intent,” Rebeccah Heinrichs, Issue Brief, No. 4111, The Heritage Foundation, December 18, 2013. Heinrichs summarizes the changes taking place in China’s nuclear defense posture, noting that rather than engage in bursts of effort and spending, China has been slowly and steadily improving its offensive nuclear capabilities for years now. She also lays out a policy program that responds to these developments and reminds us that the US has ignored its own strategic forces for far too long.

India Looks at Xi

“Taking Stock of Chinese Leader Xi Jinping’s One Year Rule,” R.S. Kalha, IDSA Comment, December 20, 2013. Kalha, of the Institute of Defense Studies and Analysis in India, takes a look at the first year of Xi Jinping’s rule from a security policy perspective. His takeaway: by focusing on Japan, Xi picked the right nemesis, managing to demonstrate the real limits to the US commitment to the security of its allies in the region. More adventurism can be expected as a result.

North Korea: When Hope for Reform Died

“North Korean Regime Change”
Ralph A. Cossa
PacNet, #90
Pacific Forum CSIS
December 16, 2013

In a thought-provoking article, Ralph Cossa, who is president of the Pacific Forum at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and a noted Korea expert, comes up with a whopper of a revelation for those of us who don’t follow North Korean politics on a daily basis.

Apparently, when Kim Jong-un had his uncle eliminated in a gruesome execution last December, he was doing more than settling a family score. Korea watchers had pegged Jang Song-thack as North Korea’s best hope for a transition away from poverty-stricken kleptocracy to a functional, modern state. Chinese observers were even suggesting that Jang was Korea’s Deng Xiaoping.

Cossa’s conclusion is chilling and makes the entire report worth a read. “Imagine China’s fate if the Gang of Four had prevailed. This may have been what just happened in Pyongyang.”