China’s Military Build-Up

If you haven’t come across Breakout, Reuters’ series on China’s evolving defense posture, treat yourself – it will be worth your time. The series – which will ultimately reach eight parts in total – is not a primer as much as it is a focus on eight different aspects of China’s rise, sort of like a Robert Kaplan book. My favorite piece so far, “The Chinese Navy Dismembers Japan,” focuses on Maneuver 5, a large-scale exercise involving much of the PLAN designed to simulate a showdown between the PLAN and the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force.

Losing our Sinocism

Picture of the Confucian philosopher Mencius.

Picture of the Confucian philosopher Mencius. (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

When I began covering China and writing a monthly newsletter in the early 1990s (the long-gone and unmourned “China Business and Economic Review,”) daily coverage of the region was scant and very general. As late as 1996, I was able to keep a weekly clippings file on all China coverage in the mainstream english media. (I did this with scissors, glue, and manila folders.)

Things have changed. Coverage of China has exploded, and keeping up with it all is a job I now leave to professional clipping services. But those services, whatever their virtues, do not give me or anyone an idea of what in this avalanche of copy is important, or how it all fits together.

For the past 18 months, Bill Bishop has tried to do that and more with his outstanding Sinocism newsletter. Fluent in Chinese and able to read through both the mass of English and Chinese coverage, Bill has provided a daily roundup of all of the news worth reading on China, curating all sources, clustering them as topics, and adding his own thoughtful annotations that put everyting into context.

For many of us, his was a vital resource. We stepped out into the day fortified with at least a feel for how things were going in China, all without having to slog through our RSS feeds or a stack of newspapers. Given how fast things move in China, that daily feel for the market was a lifeline for those of us whose jobs depend on knowing what is going on.

Today that all ends.

Despite having over 14,000 email subscribers, such a tiny percentage of those readers actually paid the paltry $5 per month for the service that Bill could not make a go of it. Bill has folded the daily publication, returned any prepaid subscription fees (did I mention he’s a mensch on top of everything else?), and out of pure passion has gone to a weekly publication.

China is a vexing place, I suspect no less for Chinese than for those of us born in parts far flung from the People’s Republic.
No single viewpoint will ever be sufficient to understand this complex place. But to lose the glasses provided by an astute observer like Bill Bishop is a mighty loss indeed.

I hope he will find some other way to continue his service, and that more of us will see fit to dig deep and support it. I fear, however, that Bill is destined to have his insights privatized and put to work for a small coterie of wealth managers and high net worth clients.

He would only be continuing a trend. One by one, the wiser heads on China have been snapped up by organizations willing to pay them for their insights. In the process, they have either slowed their published sharing, curtailed it, or placed it behind a paywall. Those wise heads receive the compensation they richly deserve. We, on the other hand, are left at a growing disadvantage to those of greater means.

This is something for us to contemplate the next time a Bill Bishop comes along. We can either shell out to support wisdom and insight, or we can lose out to those who will.

Toward a More Humane PLA

The PLA and International Humanitarian Law: Achievements and Challenges
Lt. Col. Wang Wenjuan
Institute for Security and Development Policy
Stockholm
October 2013

English: A Chinese soldier with the People's L...

English: A Chinese soldier with the People’s Liberation Army waits to assist with American and Chinese delegation’s traffic at Shenyang training base, China, March 24, 2007. Defense Dept. photo by U.S. Air Force Staff Sgt. D. Myles Cullen (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

Even leaving aside the tragic events of June 1989, speaking of the humanitarian record of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) seems almost an oxymoron. We simply do not think of the PLA in those terms.

Wang Wenjuan does, though, and in her paper she makes a clear case that China’s military leaders are at least going through the motions. She documents the understanding international humanitarian law (IHL) at the highest levels of command, the degree to which it is integrated into PLA training and indoctrination programs, and the fact that the PLA is even engaged in “research” into humanitarian law.

What matters, of course, is the behavior of the force on the battlefield and in the administration of areas captured and occupied in combat, or areas administered under a peacekeeping mandate. In the two decades during which Wang suggests that the PLA has been in compliance with IHL, the force has never faced a true test of its resolve. And there lies the rub.

In language designed carefully not to place her career in jeopardy, LTC Wang makes clear that more effort is needed to ensure that the PLA behaves in the field according to its professed ideals. History has proven that this is a tall order even for the armed forces of democratic powers (Amritsar, My Lai, and Abu Ghraib, for example.) The PLA has much to prove, and Wang understands that the PLA has a long way to go before it can face such a test.

The PLAN and Mahan

Alfred thayer mahan

China’s new strategist? (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

It is no coincidence that the officers of the Chinese navy have taken to studying the writings of American naval historian and strategist Alfred Thayer Mahan, and in particular his 1890 opus, The Influence of Seapower Upon History, 1660-1773. That Mahan’s thesis – that countries with greater naval power will have greater global influence – strikes a chord with these officers is understandable: China’s navy has been the nation’s junior service since long before the revolution, and the Sino-sailors would probably like that to end. (The official name of the force alone is testament to the naval arm’s third-class status: “People’s Liberation Army Navy.” Cue sympathetic cringe.)

But there is more to this than inter-service rivalry. What makes their fascination important to note is that it reflects a much deeper change in China. Mahan’s focus on control of commerce by sea is cut to fit a nation that is increasingly dependent on inputs from abroad and manufactured exports. Consider the facts:

  • China’s most developed regions lie on or near the coast or its major riverine arteries. In an age of standoff weapons, defending those shores needs to take place far from shore.
  • Despite huge investments in domestic road, air, and rail transport, coastwise shipping still carries a huge percentage of China’s internal trade. Unlike the US, China faces other nations across its coastal seas, some of which are latently hostile;
  • Fishing and aquaculture are becoming more important to the nation’s effort to feed itself, but the defilement of coastal fisheries by pollution and toxic runoff has forced the nation’s fishing fleet to range well beyond coastal waters;
  • China can no longer feed itself, finding itself thus increasingly dependent on the flow of foodstuffs arriving by sea from Canada, Australia, Africa, and the U.S.
  • China is becoming increasingly dependent on energy from abroad. While a good portion of that is from Eurasia (think Iran and Iraq,) regional instability makes overland shipment impractical.
  • Many of China’s key industries are reliant on from inputs from abroad. Some comes by air, but minerals and commodities flow in by sea.

Look at that list carefully, and you realize that as the PRC emerges from its underdevelopment and its generation-long stint as the world’s factory floor, it has become something different. It is now looking more like the US in the late 19th century and Japan in the early-mid 20th century than many of us recognize. China is now a mercantilist economy.

Xi Jinping gets the implications. Zach Keck at The Diplomat quotes Chinese state media summarizing part of one of the president’s recent speeches in a tone that nearly apes Mahan word-for-word: “In the 21st Century, oceans and seas have and seas have an increasingly important role to play in a country’s economic development and opening up to the outside world.”

China has been – and remains – a continental power focused on its long land frontiers. It is across those borders that have come nearly all of its historic enemies, with the notable exception of the European powers during the declining days of the Qing empire. But that history is not destiny. China is more dependent on the outside world today than it ever has been, and that realization cannot but focus the minds of China’s leaders and defenders as they start to understand the new importance of coastal defense, sea frontiers, and protecting sea lines of communication (SLOCs).

Recognizing necessity, The PRC has set itself on the course to become a maritime power. The last Asian nation to set itself on a Mahanian course was Japan. Anyone interested in understanding where China and Asia are headed could do worse than read Mahan, if not his books, than his more readable journal articles.

A Glance at the World through the Dragon’s Eye

Shadow Monk

Shadow Monk (Photo credit: AkumAPRIME)

China Threat? The Challenges, Myths, and Realities of China’s Rise
Lionel Vairon
CNTimes Books
August, 2013
160pp

As any follower of China, of global geopolitics, or The Peking Review will attest, the most troubling question about the future of China is whether or not the Middle Kingdom poses a threat to the security of its neighbors, or to any other country in the world. Ink aplenty has been split arguing both ways, and some authors (most notably Bill Gertz at the Washington Times) have made careers painting China as the inevitable adversary, our new foil in a new cold war.

For its part, China’s leaders have done little to clear the air, choosing obfuscation over transparency whenever possible. There are three possible reasons for this: Beijing may see fostering strategic uncertainty as a viable strategy while it builds national strength; the leaders may yet be unaware that it devolves on a major power to telegraph its intentions in the name of peace; or it just may be the case that there is yet no consensus or clarity in Beijing about China’s grand strategy.

Actions bespeak the same confusion. On the day after China injected itself into the fraught Mideast peace process, the People’s Daily escalated uncertainty on its doorstep by calling into question Japan’s claim of sovereignty over Okinawa.

It is into this fraught milieu that former French diplomat Lionel Vairon wades in his new book China Threat? The Challenges, Myths, and Realities of China’s Rise. Vairon pulls no punches, but he is no panda-slugger. On the contrary, some readers will be tempted to brand him a Sinopologist after reading the introduction:

“The May 2008 Sichuan earthquake, with its toll of over 80,000 dead and over fifteen million displaced, was “karma”—well deserved—for crimes supposedly committed by the Chinese against the Tibetans. This statement by American actress Sharon Stone, made at the Cannes International Film Festival in France that same month, illustrates perfectly the level of insensitivity, propaganda, and growing, gratuitous hostility that characterized the attitude of some of the Western public in the face of the successes achieved by the Chinese and their leaders after thirty years of hard work.”

To quickly dismiss Vairon with such an easy ad hominem “j’accuse” would be unwise. There is substance to his argument that, if nothing else, invites a little honest self-examination from the rest of us. Harkening to Jean-Francois Revel and his parallel examination of the ugly roots of Anti-Americanism, Vairon probes whether there may not be a similarly-motivated Anti-sinicism growing in the West.

Paradoxically, the anti-Chinese frenzy that swept over Western media and politicians at the time, in anticipation of the Olympic Games in Beijing, seems to mark the beginning of a new historical period in light of China’s rise, which may comport to some extent with Revel’s statement. This exploitation of the visible manifestations of Chinese power achieved its aim, first planting a seed of doubt in public opinion regarding the true designs of Chinese leaders behind their usually appeasing discourse before the international community, then transforming that doubt into a growing conviction that behind this façade of cooperation lurked solid hegemonic ambitions.

And therein lies Vairon’s theme: are we reading into China’s words and behaviors a veiled intent, or is that interpretation merely the projection of our own fears of decline and irrelevance? Do we not come to the whole question of China with a mille-fuille of personal biases?

Fair questions. Yet Vairon dives into even more uncomfortable territory. Do we not fear China’s implicit challenge to our Western secular ethos of ultraliberalism and globalization? A half-century after the decolonization of Africa, do our criticism’s of China’s African ventures not taste faintly of hypocrisy?

Vairon peppers his essay – for that is what this book is, an extended essay – with a series of jarring, now-wait-just-a-damned-minute assertions that provoke the American reader almost to the point of turning the book/Kindle into a lethal projectile hurled across a room. There are moments where you want to say “hey, Lionel, mon ami, can we look at what China is doing beneath all of this?”

Slogging through ninety-thousand odd words of this is hard on the preconceptions, but for any of us who care about the role of China in the future and who pride ourselves in a degree of intellectual honesty, it is essential tempering. And Vairon provides an unusually well-articulated look at the most important bi-lateral relationship in the world from the other side of the table.

Barring the unthinkable, a long road lies ahead in the relationship between China and the West. The time to ask hard questions not just about how we percieve China, but also about the nature and roots of our prejudices, is now. If we re-emerge after an honest assessment and find Bill Gertz’s voice speaking most loudly in our heads, then at least we have asked. But if we come out the other end after encountering a card-house of ill-formed opinion, then we will have been driven back to, as Deng Xiaoping once said, seek truth from facts.

And, if nothing else, we will have had a precious opportunity to see the worldview from Beijing. That can only be a good thing as we move forward. It might provide the beginnings of the empathy necessary to cross the gap between East and West. Or, in the worst of all cases, we will at least better know our enemy.

Why TPP is Not a Four-Letter Word

Strategic Implications of TPP: Answering the Critics”
Ellen Frost
East-West Center 

July 9, 2013

The East-West Center’s Ellen West explains how TPP is a good thing not only for Japan and Korea, but for the entire region. In so doing she explains – concisely – why we shouldn’t be worried about Beijing’s reaction to the treaty.

Chatham House on the Xi Administration

 

Xi Jinping - Caricature

Xi Jinping – Caricature (Photo credit: DonkeyHotey)

“The New Leadership in Beijing: Political and Economic Implications”
Kerry Brown
Chatham House
July 2013

If you have grown tired of reading analyses of Xi Jinping and his leadership program, you are not alone. The tea-leaf readers have been out in force this year, and anyone coming to the party at this point is somewhat late. But if you really care about what is going on in China, you are left with little choice but to keep reading. I do. Not necessarily because I expect a revelation with each new document, but because the better ones sharpen the definition of an incredibly fuzzy picture.

Many of my fellow China Condors and I are hoping to get some clarity about the next ten years following the coming plenum of the Party congress. The leaders have been chosen, the theory goes, and now it is time to lay out the policy platform that will guide the country over the next decade. There is much wishful thinking here: none of us are betting that we are going to be any clearer about the new leadership’s priorities then than we are now.

So we keep scouring the literature, and Kerry Brown’s paper is delightful in its brevity and clarity. Of all of his conclusions, the one that is likely to spark the most controversy (see the Eurasia Review link below) is this:

This is a leadership set up therefore for a domestic agenda and that will resist attempts to pull it more deeply into international affairs, which are seen as lying beyond what the elite define as in China’s national interests (preservation of stability, building up economic strength, safeguarding sovereignty), despite the very real pressures that will be put on it to that effect.

Comforting words, if true, particularly to China’s neighbors. Japan and the Philippines in particular are understandably worried about Chinese adventurism. Yet there is a limit implicit in Brown’s statement. The moment that China’s elite define the national interest as a plunge into international affairs – perhaps as a palliative to a restive populace, or in defense of the threatened assets of national enterprises – all bets are off.

A great read, and if you have read nothing else about the new leadership, Brown’s paper is an excellent précis of a vast and growing corpus of analysis.

Do U.S. Overtures to ASEAN Matter?

English: A screen shot from this White House v...

President Obama attends a working lunch with leaders of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations around the United Nations General Assembly Meeting in New York City. (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

“US-ASEAN Relations: Advances Made But Challenges Remain”
Prashanth Parameswaran
East-West Center
December 13, 2012

As a part of his “grand pivot tour” last fall, Barack Obama engaged with the leaders of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in an effort to rejuvenate ties that had gone fallow for nearly a decade and a half.

While progress was made, as the author of this paper points out, the bigger questions are the continuing relevance of both the U.S. and ASEAN to the futures of the nations in the region. Regional trade ties are supplanting both Europe and the United States in economic importance. The U.S. realistically does not have a lot of diplomatic bandwidth for the region. And in the face of a series of more relevant groupings, like the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP,) ASEAN is starting to look dated, much as SEATO became in the wake of the fall of South Vietnam.

All of this complicates U.S. foreign policy, but it plays into the hands of a China looking to define Asia outside the grasp of the United States, Russia, and Europe. For the first time since the Second World War, then, the region is starting to wonder what it needs America for in the first place. Perhaps it is time the U.S. began reassessing our own interests in the region.

Pushing Away from Peace

An Awkward Embrace: The United States and China in the 21st Century
Dan Blumenthal and Phillip Swagel
AEI Press
November, 2012

As the friction between Beijing and Washington simmers, we assume that China bears the heaviest responsibility in the decline of the relationship. Dan Blumenthal and Phillip Swagel of the American Enterprise Institute aren’t buying the easy answer. Instead, they dive into what makes the Sino-American relationship works. What they find is unsettling: two giants locked in an embrace in which neither is comfortable, yet that neither can break.

For the authors, the economic ties hold the key to continued peace, or, by their decline, the cause of war. In an article in The National Interest, Blumenthal and Swagel note:

A dispute that upended this web of trade and financial ties would have serious negative consequences for both nations. For the United States, this would lead to higher prices for everything made in China—which at times feels like nearly everything—and steeper interest rates on debt for business and government. These negative impacts would be felt by every American. For China, the loss of the United States as a major export market would mean weaker growth and slower job creation, and thus undermine political and social stability. This instability is the ruling party’s nightmare and thus the source of leverage for the United States.

Ironically, we are urging China to take steps for its economy that will make it less dependent on foreign direct investment and exports. At the same time, we are finding more reasons, both commercial and economic, to shift the locus of our manufacturing away from China. Finally, with a few notable exceptions, we are making it clear to China that America’s assets are not for sale – at least not to them.

Without realizing it, then, we are weakening the regime of economic and commercial codependency that has been the primary guarantee of peace between the two nations. And we are doing so even as China faces domestic instability, reaches an apogee of military power and diplomatic influence, and is stoking nationalist belligerence.

Blumenthal and Swagel have crafted a poignant portrait of Sino-American interdependence. In the process, they remind us of the danger of proferring simplistic solutions to the challenges that plague this key relationship. The more Washington and Beijing let domestic politics guide international relations, the closer they bring conflict.

Also at Amazon.com.

Allies on the High Frontier

English: Backdropped by a blue and white part ...

The unpiloted Japanese H-II Transfer Vehicle (HTV) approaches the International Space Station. (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

Strategic Imperatives for US–Japan Outer Space Cooperation
Crystal Pryor
East-West Center

December 7, 2012

The irony of publishing an essay advocating closer cooperation between the U.S. and Japan in the military sphere on the anniversary of Pearl Harbor is palpable, to the point where you wonder if the wags at the East-West Center did this on purpose.

Regardless of intent, Crystal Pryor brings up an issue that is easy to forget in these fraught times in the East China Sea: space. China is on a tear in space, accelerating its manned orbital program and beginning the long effort that will take taikonauts to the Moon. And let’s not forget – China has proven it can take out just about any satellite it pleases.

Pryor calls for closer peaceful cooperation between the U.S. and Japan in space, and little wonder: experience on the International Space Station revealed some avenues for cooperation. But Japan could be forgiven for having a hidden agenda. Space, even unmanned, is increasingly important to national security and economic growth, and Japan cannot defend its orbital interests alone. Overt military cooperation with the U.S. in space would be an outright provocation. Civilian partnerships, though, could lead to deeper ties if events develop.

Japan’s problem, though, is that NASA is in a torpor. It will have to either rouse the beast, or it will need to find ways to build alliances with the growing bevy of private space companies. Near term, bet on the latter.

Viewing the Pivot from the Air

 

A B-2 Spirit soars after a refueling mission o...

A B-2 Spirit soars after a refueling mission over the Pacific Ocean on Tuesday, May 30, 2006. (U.S. Air Force photo/Staff Sgt. Bennie J. Davis III) (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

The Summer 2013 issue of the Strategic Studies Quarterly is out, and the Air Force publication spends most of its space this quarter on Asia, China, and the Pivot. Starting with an excellent essay by David Shambaugh (“Assessing the US Pivot to Asia,”) the publication amounts to a quiet announcement that the Air Force Research Institute (AFRI) is now focused on China.

No surprise. But what is disappointing is the AFRI’s failure to ask the most difficult political question: does the USAF have the wherewithal – in doctrine, in training, in force structure, and (most critically) in equipment – to credibly face off against China in even the coldest of conflicts? Of all the services, this is most important to the Air Force, which was guided in its formative years by leaders who were shaped in the crucible of European wars and hardened during the Cold War face-off with the USSR in Europe. Tactical warfare over vast distances is not in the USAF’s DNA, and it is not in the DNA of the aircraft upon which it has chosen to bet its future.

What one can hope, however, is that the AFRI is leading the Air Force by its nose into a future that demands a different kind of air service by compelling the organization to contemplate its challenges and look itself in the mirror. The odds are long: the AFRI sits under the Air Force, and as such depends on the kindness of the very leaders it should be criticizing.

The USAF lacks what the Navy has in the Naval Institute, an independent forum of officers and senior enlisted people who can have an unimpeded conversation about the future of the service. That’s bad. There are Air Force officers with vision who understand that the future of the USAF as an independent service is on the line. That they must depend on an in-house organ to make their case makes it too easy to pull punches, to step back from the brink of saying what needs to be said.

Pick up the new edition of SSQ. If nothing else, it marks and important beginning of a conversation too long delayed.

Does Thailand Want the US to Pivot?

Thailand guard

Thailand guard (Photo credit: @Doug88888)

“After Obama’s Visit: The US-Thailand Alliance and China”
Sasiwan Chingchit

East-West Center
December 4, 2012

The underlying assumption of U.S. President Barack Obama‘s strategy to shift the focus of the U.S. security establishment away from Southwest Asia and Europe to Southeast Asia is that the locals are going to be happy with the idea. A read of Sasiwan Chingchit’s essay, though, makes you wonder.

The author suggests that despite a long friendship with the U.S. that peaked in the early 1970s, Thai attentions and affections have since shifted north, to China. Little wonder: since China backed the Thai economy during the dark days of the 1997 Asian financial crisis, the money has continued to flow from China and into the Thai economy in the form of loans, direct investment, and plume of tourists that grows by the year. That one Thai in five is ethnically Chinese probably doesn’t hurt. The message is clear: don’t think you’re going to swoop in here and turn us against our new benefactors to the north.

Chingchit makes a fair point, but the elephant in the room should be obvious to any Thai realist: what happens if the price of Chinese friendship gets a little too high?

Thailand is not alone in Southeast Asia in finding itself caught between two giants. On the one hand, relations with the rising China carry the promise of commercial and economic benefit. On the other, the U.S. presence in Asia stands as a guarantor that limits China’s ambitions to the commercial sphere. Having the U.S. and China at loggerheads on their behalf suits the smaller nations of Asia as the competition between two eligible bachelors suits the coquette.

What happens, then, when the U.S., tired of a low diplomatic return on its security investment, allows the pivot to become a dead letter and leaves Southeast Asia to manage its own fate? The last time the region was without a capable protector it fell under the shadow of Japan’s East-Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere. It does not take a surfeit of imagination to see something altogether similar happening again.

NOREF – China’s impact on conflict and fragility in South Asia

“China’s impact on conflict and fragility in South Asia
Clare Castillejo
NOREF- Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre
25 January 2013

While the rest of us are focused on East Asia, FRIDE’s Clare Castillejo takes a look at how China’s growing interest in South Asia – particularly Pakistan, Afghanistan, Sri Lanka, and Nepal – is starting to change the field for both India and for the rest of the world.

While I wish she would expand her analysis to include Burma and Bangladesh, Castillejo moves our eyes to a critical hub of activity. India of late has sought greater influence in the South China sea, particularly with Vietnam, and has been seen canoodling with Japan. If China can build a containment field around India’s north, political pressure inside India to refocus defense on the near-abroad would redound in China’s favor in East Asia.

The game is afoot, and China is having to play it on multiple fronts. This paper reminds us that China still sees its most immediate geopolitical rival most clearly when it looks across the Himalayas, not the Pacific.

What is Beijing Thinking?

 

English: Profile image of Hu Shuli

English: Profile image of Hu Shuli (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

China 3.0
Mark Leonard, et. al.
The European Council on Foreign Relations
November 2012

Those of us watching the goings-on in Chinese politics have been treated to the non-fiction equivalent of a byzantine soap opera over the past two years. The unexpectedly turbulent generational leadership transition has given us opportunity to speculate ad nauseum about who was going to get what seat, a debate doubly invigorated by the drama surrounding Bo Xilai‘s metoric rise and fall.

But the seats are filling, the slate of leaders is falling into place, and our attention turns from personalities to policies. What, exactly, are those leaders going to be doing for the next ten years?

President Xi Jinping and Premier Li Keqiang have begun to lay out their policy priorities, but there are few surprises or insights to be gleaned from public positions. Of far greater interest are the debates taking place within government and the nation’s intelligentsia over the path to take in the future. As James McGregor summarizes in his recent book No Ancient Wisdom, No Followers, for the first time in generations the path forward for China is unclear, there are contending schools of thought at the top of the Party organization, and China lives under the threat of indecision and paralysis in Beijing.

Which is why this slim volume, edited by Mark Leonard, c0-founder and director of the European Council on Foreign Relations, is such a valuable survey. Rather than focusing on the dramatics, Leonard’s line up of scholars and observers (including Caixing’s Hu Shuli and blogger Michael Anti) focus on how the debates around finding that way forward are playing out.

In the course of a dozen pithy essays we are treated to a glimpse of how the nation’s leaders are thinking about the future of domestic politics, the economy, foreign policy, and the search for models from which China can glean its own pathway to the future. Most of us will never get a chance to sit in the halls where these decisions are being made, but in China 3.0 Leonard and the ECFR have given us a chance to sit outside the door and listen at the keyhole, all while being treated to the perspectives of 17 of China’s own most astute observers.

Do Washington and Beijing Offer Alternative World Orders?

Between Integration and Coexistence: US-Chinese Strategies of International Order
Liselotte Odgaard
Strategic Studies Quarterly
Spring 2013

The past five years have witnessed much debate as to whether a world order dominated by liberal internationalists institutions (UN, WTA, World Bank, IMF, etc) has reached the end of its era, and whether perhaps the time has arrived for the rise of a new international order that finds its inspiration in China. The rise of the Chinese economy, the nation’s growing assertiveness in international affairs, and its readiness to interpret international agreements to suit its own purposes makes that question real. Is China happy to run rampant across an established world order, or does it sincerely propose to offer a unique international order of its own?

In an article in the just-released edition of Strategic Studies Quarterly, Danish security strategist Dr. Liselotte Odgaard notes that China and America have espoused two visions of the way the world should work, but she suggests that they are incompatible. Why? Because both are based on domestic ideologies that appear to prevent either side coming to a practical accommodation. The real challenge is whether either of these approaches will garner international support. Odgaard takes a bold step by suggesting which side she thinks will prevail and why.

Why China will make its own rules

Drawing of an early Chinese soldier lighting a...

Drawing of an early Chinese soldier lighting a rocket (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

“More Security for Rising China, Less for Others?”
Denny Roy

East-West Center
January 2013
8pp

In this brief but thoughtful paper, Denny Roy suggests that China’s days of playing by international rules are over. He notes that despite China’s assertions that it will play within international bounds and rise peacefully, mounting evidence suggests otherwise.

Specifically, Roy points to two factors that will put an end to the “peaceful rise.” First is a strong sense of Chinese manifest destiny that the nation is the rightful leader (read “hegemon”) in Asia, both among the leaders in Beijing and the Chinese people. The second is the constant stoking of nationalism by a new generation of leaders who, uncertain about the course to chart for the nation at home, is turning to international conflict to keep the country united.

What will determine China’s success, Roy suggests, is not what is said in Washington or Brussels, but what the nations of Asia do in response to China’s efforts. The nations of the region can simply give in to becoming satellite states within an uncontested Chinese sphere of influence, or they can work to stop it.

To date, the region has been happy to let the US fight its battles, but it will be Asia, and in particular India and Japan, who will be compelled to respond to an increasingly aggressive – and entitled – China.

Meet the New Generals. Same as the Old Generals?

“China’s New Military Leadership and the Challenges It Faces
Greg Chaffin
National Bureau of Asian Research

Greg Chaffin interviews Roy Kamphausen, Senior Advisor for Political and Security Affairs at NBR, on what he thinks the new Central Military Commission will mean for the People’s Liberation Army and for China’s defense posture.

Today’s Free eBook: Crisis and Escalation in Cyberspace

Crisis and Escalation in Cyberspace
Martin C. Libicki
RAND
2012
198pp

We are starting a new feature of The Peking Review today: our Free eBook of the Day.

While the books featured here will usually have a China hook (and we’ll explain it when it does), the primary purpose of this feature is to simply call your attention to a book we think our readers might find interesting that is available for the effort of a download.

Our first book is Martin Libicki’s examination of what the US Air Force would have to do if it found itself operating in the midst of a cyber-attack. As the most technologically-dependent of the US services, the Air Force makes a superb test-case of the rigors of operating in a hostile electronic environment.

As China is the implicit adversary in a conflict of this nature, it is a compelling read for those of us watching events both immediate and long-term unfold in the western Pacific.

Perspective on China’s New Senior Services

“China’s Navy and Air Force: Advancing Capabilities and Missions
Greg Chaffin interviews Andrew S. Erickson
National Bureau of Asian Research
September 27, 2012

With the most recent changes in the Central Military Commission, the Chinese Navy and Air Force now have a degree of prominence denied them for the past six decades. With the growing importance of global trade and far-flung interests, these services look to be the focus of defense policy during Xi Jinping’s first term.

Andrew S. Erickson of the U.S. Naval War College and Harvard University offers his perspective on why this is the case and what it will mean for the world in a thoughtful interview with Greg Chaffin of the NBR.

Getting Real about China’s Naval Modernization

Mr. Ronald O'Rourke

Mr. Ronald O’Rourke (Photo credit: USNavalInstitute)

China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities–Background and Issues for Congress
Ronald O’Rourke

Congressional Research Service
December 10, 2012

It is a part of Chinese grand strategy to keep its potential enemies, its friends, and even its own people guessing as to the capabilities and intentions of the People’s Liberation Army. While most of the world has discovered through bitter experience that the resulting uncertainty is inherently destabilizing, China remains wedded to opacity at the deepest levels of doctrine.

In U.S. politics, this gives license to hawks of all stripes to rally for greater defense spending even as it permits more cautious voices to claim that China is a paper tiger. The resulting debates ensure that there can be no coherent response until it is too late.

Ronald O’Rourke is one of a handful of experts who can take these politically-charged issues and bring them down to the level of actual operational challenges. His simple recitation of the facts will provide few doves with any degree of comfort, but it is a relief to see the facts stripped of rhetoric.

Finding Innovation in Dark Corners

“Global Technology Sourcing in China’s Integrated Circuit Design Industry: A Conceptual Framework and Preliminary Findings”
Dieter Ernst and Barry Naughton
East-West Center
August 2012

For nearly a decade, Chinese policy-makers have been on a seemingly Quixotic quest to turn the nation’s low-cost manufacturers into innovation-driven firms. The question that has plagued that effort from the start is whether Beijing’s “indigenous innovation” drive isn’t just a form of techno-protectionism, and if not, whether and how policy might actually aid in the emergence of world-class innovative firms.

That question remains largely unanswered, but Dieter Ernst and Berry Naughton have gone looking for answers in China’s integrated circuit design business. What the paper reveals is an example of how innovation is taking place outside the purview of government industrial policy, calling into question the value of centrally-driven strategic emerging industries.

A growing body of evidence suggests that the ship of state capitalism will founder on the rocks of innovation. The emergence of the new and the novel from overlooked quarters offers a reminder of the agrarian entrepreneurialim that emerged in 1980s China when Deng Xiaoping simply lifted the heavy hand of central planning. Ernst and Naughton’s study seems to points the nation toward a more productive approach to industrial innovation, yet one that would sorely test the natural interventionist urge of Party aparatchiks.

When the French Left Fell Out of Love with Maoism

Roland Barthes

Roland Barthes (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

 

The Sideways Gaze: Roland Barthes’s Travels In China
Dora Zhang
Los Angeles Review of Books
June 23, 2012

I am an unabashed fanboy of the Los Angeles Review of Books, for several reasons. First, the publication was pulled together by a group of literary critics that had been marginalized since Tribune & Company all but disowned serious coverage of the arts in the Los Angeles Times. The very existence of LARB is a thumb in the eye of both the Times and the local alternative press. Perhaps more important, it stands as testament that the vibrancy of culture in California does not depend on the support of mainstream media: the Golden State has become a center of the arts and literature to rival New York and Paris nearly ex nihilio.

The third reason I am such a fan is that LARB under co-founder and publisher Tom Lutz chose Megan Shank as Asia Co-Editor. That Lutz was motivated to give Asia such a profile in the publication spoke volumes both about the publication and the comparative short-shrift the region is given among other mainstream publications. That he chose Shank, who spent six years living in and covering China, speaks volumes about how serious he wants that effort to be.

A great example of the fruit of that effort is Dora Zhang’s excellent review of Roland Barthes’ Travels in China. Zhang offers more than an essay extolling the book’s virtues and vices. What she offers instead is a chronicle of how in the wake of a 1974 trip to China, the elite of the French left fell out of love with Maoist China.

In the process, she holds up a mirror to those of us who, at some point in our lives, believed with perhaps a tad too much credulity that China represented the birth of a new world order. We may sneer at the gullibility of those French Maoists of the 1960s and 1970s, but what of we pale-faced Dengists of the 1990s and 2000s? Did some of us not believe that China would grow rich and strong and change the world, even for the better? Do some of us yet bristle and lash out at those who criticize the Middle Kingdom? And why do we do so?

Even at its most inscrutable moment in modern history as the Cultural Revolution reached its final crescendo in the mid 1970s, China beguiled outsiders. Zhao focuses on Barthes not because he was the least beguiled, but because his disenchantment was incited by small things that with others might have been dismissed or unnoticed. Try as he might, Barthes could never “connect” with China on his terms. I come away from Zhao’s review wondering if each of us, in our own time, will find ourselves disconnected from China, and thence disenchanted.

What then?

Is Brazil Helping China Train Carrier Pilots?

“Using BRIC to build at sea: The Brazil-China Aircraft Carrier Agreement and Shifting Naval Power”
Kai Thaler

IPRIS Viewpoints #9
IPRIS – Portuguese Institute of International Relations and Security

As the discussion fades over China’s first aircraft carrier, it is worth diving into exactly how China is building its carrier force. As much as China’s politicians and many of China’s people might want to think that the Navy’s renewal is an entirely homegrown project, in reality China is drawing from sources around the world to cobble together its naval aviation arm.

The Liaoning itself is, of course, the former Varyag, a Soviet-designed Admiral Kuznetzov class “aircraft-carrying heavy cruiser” around half the size of a U.S. Nimitz-class aircraft carrier. China purchased four carriers – the ex HMAS Melbourne from Australia, and the Varyag, Minsk, and Kiev from the republics of the former Soviet Union. As IPRIS expert Kai Thaler notes, the ships were purchased to introduce aircraft carrier construction and engineering to China’s navy and her shipyards as a part of China’s longstanding plans to build a carrier.

But Thaler’s revelations go further. More than just drawing from foreign sources for hardware, China had also signed an agreement with Brazil to have that country’s navy help train Chinese carrier aviators. The question is what this signals in terms of the Brazil-China relationship. While much attention has been focused on China’s relationships with pariah western hemisphere states like Cuba and Venezuela, the relationship between Brasilia and Beijing clearly deserves further attention as both countries gain in global influence.

Zbigniew Brzezinski and America’s Pivot

How U.S. Can Secure the New East
Zbigniew Brzezinski

The Diplomat

All too often I find myself on the opposite side of an issue with Mr. Brzezinski, but his recent contribution to The Diplomat is deserving of consideration. His feeling: the U.S. should stay out of direct military involvement of conflicts among Asian powers.

While not altogether unique (I hear echoes of Douglas MacArthur), the warning is timely. With our strategic pivot to Asia, the U.S. looks altogether too ready to leap into a fray over the South China Sea, to give one example. In that there are some twenty unresolved border conflicts involving China alone, we may be writing a check the U.S. armed forces could never cash.

What worries me about Mr. Brzezinski’s advice are telltale signs that Jimmy Carter’s former National Security Advisor has some reasonably large blind-spots in Asia. In describing the strains between India and China, for example, he is oddly silent on the matters of Tibet, the Himalayan republics, and Sino-Indian territorial disputes. Instead, he isolates Pakistan and India’s naval power as the core points of contention.

He suggests getting too close to India would open the door for Russia in Central Asia as America would be “distracted.” All of this, of course, assumes capability that it is unclear lies within the grasp of Putin’s Kremlin and that China and India would sit idly while it happened.

More disturbingly, Brzezinski seems blind to the calculation of the Asian nations who on the one hand are concerned about China’s growing power, but on the other hand want to profit from deep engagement in its rise. Walking this fine line would be served elegantly by drawing the U.S. into the “bad cop” role in Asia, allowing Singapore, Indonesia, South Korea, Japan, and the Philippines to play off the US and China against one another to their benefit.

He concludes:

Ultimately, the United States’ geopolitical role in the new East will have to be based on mediation, conciliation and balancing and not on military engagement in mainland Asia.

A fine sentiment, but allow us to suggest an alternative formulation.

Ultimately, the United States’ geopolitical role in the new East will have to be based on a careful calculation of our interests, a recognition that, paradoxically, our power and influence in the region may best be served by engagement at a distance.

China’s appetite for regional and global influence far exceeds its current and projected capabilities. A true realist might suggest giving China enough rope to make its own noose.