The United States has a long-established system for reviewing foreign investments in the United States, a process that is understandably highly political given both self-interested protectionism and legitimate national defense concerns that grapple with the interests of entrepreneurs and shareholders seeking greater opportunity or a simple cash-out.
China’s growing hunger for offshore investments has already begun testing that process, in particular with Huawei‘s recent attempt to snap up the leftover assets of a bankrupt technology startup in California. Huawei’s application – filed after the fact – was rejected, and it seems likely that more Chinese companies will face challenges as they attempt to use acquisitions as a pathway to globalization.
At some point China is likely to want to cast a global spotlight on the U.S. foreign investment review process (and would have done so sooner but for the attention it would have brought to its own), and when it does, the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) will find itself under global scrutiny.
Following the 2006 controversy around Dubai Ports World and its attempt to acquire the U.S. port operations of P&O Steam Navigation Company, Alan Larson and David Marchick at the Council on Foreign Relations conducted a study on the U.S. foreign investment review process and the CFIUS in particular. The recommendations made in Foreign Investment and National Security: Getting the Balance Right suggest that the U.S. needs to ensure that the process remains sheltered from political and commercial interests, remaining a purely national security issue.
At its heart, though, the short book is a reasoned defense of what the authors clearly believe to be a fair process, if not quite a model for similar processes overseas. Their greatest concern is in the matter of transparency, and it is worth dwelling on that for a bit.
China is in the habit of rejecting foreign investments with greater frequency, an expression of an all-but-explicit national industrial policy that implicitly questions the value of foreign ownership of Chinese companies. That foreign firms continue to pursue acquisitions of healthy Chinese corporations in blithe ignorance of this policy implies either willful ignorance on the part of executives, legal counsel, and investment banks, or that it is time for China to be more transparent in the criteria it uses to evaluate foreign investments.
A fair case could be made that the CFIUS is less interested in transparency than it is in national security, and this is fair. But if the cross-border flow of investments and ownership are to continue between the world’s two largest economies and the ties that bind them to a common interest are not to be severed, the CFIUS must ensure that it offers the greatest transparency possible consistent with national security.
For this reason alone, Larson and Marchick’s work deserves detailed review.