The writing of imaginative prose demands an unfettered intellect, something incompatible with political orthodoxy of any stripe
A fascinating review of why China developed a neutron bomb, and then, after all of the effort and expense, did not deploy it.
Hong Kong, as the freest economy in the world, is an ideal place for global capital to enter the mainland. With the further opening of China’s capital account, Shanghai could one day outshine Hong Kong, but only if property rights are protected under the rule of law understood as a meta-legal principle whereby all individuals are guided by what F. A Hayek called “rules of just conduct.”
In all of our excitement about what this might mean for the finance industry, let us keep in mind that there are as many good reasons for staying out of Chinese investments right now than there are for getting in.
The official Party Line on what is taking place in Hong Kong is a must-read for anyone following this situation.
Originally posted on Quartz:
Quartz has examined the harsh message that the Chinese government sent to protesters in Hong Kong in an editorial warning them of “unimaginable consequences.” Now we have translated the full text of that editorial.
It’s a classic Communist Party political screed, full of vague terms, veiled threats, and arguments that are logically sound but rest on untenable assumptions. The piece was published on Oct. 1 in the People’s Daily, an official state newspaper and the same publication responsible for the government’s notorious April 26, 1989 message to Tiananmen Square protesters in Beijing. That message preceded the brutal crackdown on demonstrations on June 4, which killed hundreds or thousands, depending on estimates. As we note in our analysis, there are some striking similarities between these two documents.
We have also included a translation of the 1989 piece (by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service, a now-defunct part of the US Central Intelligence Agency) for comparison, below.
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Professor Seiichiro Takagi of the Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIAA) explains how Xi Jinping’s “New Asian Security Concept,” introduced by the Chinese president in May, is designed to place China in the dominant position in Asia, not only from a security standpint, but on political and economic bases as well.
Reading between the lines (Japanese scholars are not always as blunt as they could be), Takagi is suggesting that the NASC is little more than a Chinese version of the Warsaw Pact, brought to Asia. It suggests, therefore, that China is attempting to stake out a share of the world over which it exercises dominance, if not control.
As a Japanese scholar, Takagi is hardly a disinterested third party: Japan and China have been squaring off with increasing regularity, and Tokyo is seen by many in Beijing as America’s running dog. At the same time, Takagi’s point is worth noting, and it invites closer scrutiny of exactly what Xi Jinping is trying to accmplish with his NASC.
“Re-Think Chinese Policy Toward DPRK“
Bonnie S. Glaser
Issue 7, February 2013
In this short paper, Bonnie Glaser at the CSIS presents a cogent, well-framed case for China to cut its assistance to North Korea as a means of getting the DPRK to stop its rogue behavior. As much sense as the paper will make on Capitol Hill, it is unlikely to change China’s stance. This is because the paper does not consider the internal logic that drives Beijing’s calculus on North Korea.
While Beijing’s “dog” on the Korean peninsula enjoys biting the hand that feeds it, the dog still guards China’s back door. It remains a buffer designed to ensure that neither the US nor South Korea have forces crouched on the Yalu frontier. Its rogue behavior diverts the heat of international opprobrium as China begins to assert its own strategic posture and build its military. The loyalty Beijing continues to extend to the DPRK is a demonstration to all other allies and prospective allies that Beijing is a reliable friend, even when the going gets tough. Finally, Beijing would hate to have somebody else – Russia, for example – step in and become Pyongyang’s patron.
So Beijing cutting off Pyongyang is probably not in the cards. What is likely to be in the cards, however, is a careful effort by China to prove the the mercurial Kim Family Regime that there are wiser courses of action to pursue, and that China continues to be its best possible benefactor. Whether that will yield any worthwhile results is anyone’s guess.
“China’s Strategic Capabilities and Intent,” Rebeccah Heinrichs, Issue Brief, No. 4111, The Heritage Foundation, December 18, 2013. Heinrichs summarizes the changes taking place in China’s nuclear defense posture, noting that rather than engage in bursts of effort and spending, China has been slowly and steadily improving its offensive nuclear capabilities for years now. She also lays out a policy program that responds to these developments and reminds us that the US has ignored its own strategic forces for far too long.