“China’s New Military Leadership and the Challenges It Faces“
Greg Chaffin
National Bureau of Asian Research
Greg Chaffin interviews Roy Kamphausen, Senior Advisor for Political and Security Affairs at NBR, on what he thinks the new Central Military Commission will mean for the People’s Liberation Army and for China’s defense posture.
ADMIRAL RAYMOND A. SPRUANCE, USN (Photo credit: roberthuffstutter)
The Quiet Warrior: A Biography of Admiral Raymond A. Spruance
Thomas B. Buell
Naval Institute Press
January 1987
518 pages
“There are two kinds of people in this world,” a Chinese executive told me once. “The kind of people who speak for themselves, and the kind who let their deeds speak for them.”
This insight not only compelled me to look at my own life (which one am I?), it also forced me to re-evaluate my heroes. Who among my pantheon was a doer, and who did some good things but was really exceptional at tooting his own horn (or paying others to toot if for them?) What does it say about an individual who crafts his or her life after one type or the other? And what does it say about nations that make heroes of narcissists?
Old “Electric Brain“
Admiral Ernest J. King, the Chief of Naval Operations in World War II, thought Raymond Spruance was the single most intelligent U.S. naval commander in the war. Given the competition – Nimitz, Turner, Halsey, McCain, Leahy, and King himself – this was high praise. Yet Spruance today is largely unknown outside of the relatively small circle of mariners, historians, and history buffs. Why?
Thomas Buell, himself a naval officer, offers an answer with his definitive portrait Spruance, the enigmatic commander who made the critical decisions at Midway and led the US Navy-Marine Corps team in their legendary drive across the Central Pacific. Throughout his life, his subordinates and superiors all came in turn came to rely on his quiet intellect, his preternatural calm under fire, and his ability to size up a situation and act with deliberation, neither vacillating like Ghormley nor impetuous like Halsey.
Working from a relatively small number of sources on Spruance, Buell gives us no great insights that will change the way we think of war, but it will change the way we think of warriors, their flacks, and their biographers. Buell paints a credibly human picture of Spruance, and rather than inflate him to larger-than-life size, offers us the spartan, taciturn, stone-faced career officer whose deeds remain greater than the man himself. It would have been easy for the author to write a panegyric, but you can almost hear the ghost of Spruance whispering over his shoulder, telling Buell not to go down that path. While ably defending Spruance against criticism of his actions at Midway (later proven to be correct), Buell uses the same historiographical care to excoriate the admiral’s actions during his tenure as Ambassador to the Philippines.
The Smartest Man in the Navy
Buell also points out more sublime examples of Spruance’s leadership that resonate today. Spruance led his fleet with a staff that was a fraction of the size of Halsey’s, demonstrating an economy that the brass-bloated navy of today has forgotten: he was early to recognize and defend geniuses like Kelly Turner and Carl Moore against the capricious politics of the Navy; he was a battleship officer who never learned to fly, yet absorbed so much about carrier aviation that he became one of the country’s ablest commanders of airpower; he oversaw the reinvention of naval logistics, a factor the Japanese navy recognized as the keystone to the US victory in the Pacific; and he grasped early that American bases in postwar Asia would be an irritant that would lead to further conflict.
And then there was that intellect: rebelling against the provincial, trade-school approach the navy had taken to professional education, he spent the last years of his career turning the Naval War College into an outstanding graduate school with unparalleled programs in strategy, national security, and world affairs. While nothing he did will surpass his feats as a commander, in terms of its importance to the nation, to sea power, and to global security his two years as President of the College are unmatched.
Buell also offers us an illustration as to why, seven decades after the end of the conflict, we are still unearthing truths that compel us to reevaluate how we understand the war, history, power, and leadership. As we do, we are finding that many of the lessons our fathers learned from their victories are wrong, and many of the right lessons have been forgotten. The time has come for a reappraisal of that conflict: as we watch the rise of a new set of world powers, now more than ever we need to understand why World War II was won (or lost), and we need to find the people who were really responsible, not just the heroes and villains our fathers’ textbooks served to us. Raymond Spruance offers us a timeless model of leadership in crisis. We would be wrong if we did not go looking for more.
Today, as we struggle to shake off the misguided belief that financial chicanery can be a viable substitute for vision and innovation, Joe Wilson’s story points the way to a future where America draws its livelihood and competitiveness from its industry rather than its greed, and where finance is again the handmaiden of commerce and commerce serves the people. More…
Image by The U.S. Army via Flickr
When I was in high school, I had a European History teacher who explained to us how countries with an large cohort of breeding-age young men relative to the rest of the population were more likely to make war on their neighbors. The argument was simple: too much young testosterone lying around was a sufficient domestic political liability that it needed to be spent in the advancement of national interests abroad. Hence, war.
I have always found this a tad deterministic, so I was pleased to see Martin Libicki and his co-authors publish Global Demographic Change and its Implications for Military Power. While the authors stop short of a full debunking of the population pressure theory of war, they analyze it in a modern context, incorporating historic data and using data to call into question the prospect of a future (2011-2050) conflict driven by “too many boys.”
The examination is thorough and convincing, but I have to wonder whether or not India’s growing working-age population vis-a-vis China will not, at some point, offer India a manpower advantage over China in any trans-Himalayan conflict. China’s effort to control its population and put its young people to work in more productive pursuits has been admirable, but India has not kept up to the same extent by either measure. Left with lots of young people, would not India choose to reclaim disputed territories on the Chinese border versus allowing their frustrations to fester into sectarian violence?
An excellent and worthy read, especially for those of us focused on Asian security.
In a new special report, Wharton and the Boston Consulting Group explore how companies need to figure out how to operate in a world where their core markets are developing at radically different paces.
This is an interesting thesis, and will be of varied value depending on the industry, but for any company in the internet and technology businesses trying to bridge the BRIC countries on the one hand and the developed economies on the West on the other, this is an essential read.
My only quibble with the thesis would be the question “is this a two speed world or ten speed world.” Certainly China and the UK are now growing at two different speeds. On the other hand it could also be argued that the pace of market development varies widely among the BRIC countries, to say nothing of the differences among the BRICs, the West, and Africa.
In short, Wharton is taking the first steps in an important direction with this report, helping companies rethink and restructure to address this emerging challenge of globalization. Expect to see more debate along these lines in the future.
While it is easy for a consultant to tell a would-be entrepreneur to stay out of mature and competitive industries, such advice is not always possible to follow. This pdf book delves into what it takes to be an entrepreneur – or an intrapreneur – in a highly competitive sector.
One learns much about an armed service from the number and type of awards it bestows upon itself, and the U.S. Air Force is no exception. A pdf book.
Image via Wikipedia
It was never a given that air forces would be a part of the U.S. armed forces, and while the uses and efficacy of air power have been the subject of much hyperbole from advocates in the past, the U.S. and its allies were fortunate that a few outspoken leaders made the case for military aviation in the wake of opposition from ground and sea forces.
How those advocates evolved as the Air Force and Naval Aviation migrated from being outsiders to establishment is a fascinating study, because it explains why the public is frequently oversold – or mis-sold – on the capabilities of those who fly through the air.
This is particularly germane because in the wake of the “Long War” and more intensive budget pressures on the U.S. armed forces, there is once again a growing voice for the disestablishment of the U.S. Air Force as a separate service, and the considerable downsizing of naval aviation. With its focus on some of the more colorful personalities in the history of American military aviation, this book is a fascinating as well as topical read.
A fascinating study by Demos and Orange that dives into the role of social networks and formal organizational structures. A must-read for anyone trying to figure out the role of social media in the workplace.
A collection of vignettes from the U.S. Army Command & General Staff College on leadership under fire. A pdf book.
A fascinating study about the pace of change in a business that resists it.
Find the pdf book here.
