A fascinating look at how the Soviet Union pursued its aims to not only spread revolution, but to attempt to control those countries as well. Obviously China was no Baltic republic, but Stalin seemed to overestimate the extent to which he could keep China in his corner.
I’ve been doing a deep-dive on Yan’an lately, with a view to separating the contemporary reality with the current myth. This has been an interesting companion resource.
A pdf book from the University of Kansas. One has to ask whether foreigners (Soviets included) were hesitant to go into the communist regions, whether this was justified, and whether the CCP was wise or misguided in not appearing to be more open.
These are not trivial questions. A cynic could suggest that as the civil war progressed the CCP was uncomfortable giving the world a view of its actions in areas under its control. An apologist would point to the rough handling the CCP had received from the US and Brits and to the suspicion Stalin had earned for his agents.
I take a middle path. Mao was a latent xenophobe, was actively tapping the xenophobia latent in the nation, and it served the Party’s purposes to underscore that this was a purely Chinese revolution.
More evidence that the Mao and the CCP played the nationalism card better than Chiang and the Kuomintang.